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GENERAL
BACKGROUND

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Atmospherics and General Background on House Select
Committee Investigation

I. Background

In mid-November, the Deputy Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee, speaking to an Agency employee concerned with the House Select Committee investigation made the following comment: "We in the Senate have a larger staff than the House, have been investigating longer than the House, and have a more solid Congressional mandate than the House. By all accounts, we should be conducting a better investigation than the House. The trouble is, that we keep chasing 'rogue mice', while somehow or other, the House comes up with the substantive issues, and asks the really penetrating questions."

To a certain extent, this comment is valid, but the House Select Committee (HSC) investigation has gone through a rapid metamorphosis to reach the point described above. The original HSC mandate was not spelled out in specific terms. Chairman Otis Pike made it clear from the outset that he was determined not to have his staff duplicate in their investigations what the Senate had already undertaken. To a large extent, Pike has made good on his determination. At the start of the HSC investigation, however, his staff members, not knowing what they were looking for, engaged in unfocused "fishing expeditions", which are reflected in some of the very broad requests they levied upon the Agency. The HSC staffers are quite young and many of them lacked any previous investigative experience. The HSC Staff Director, A. Searle Field, a 32 year old Republican lawyer from New York, has from the first directed his subordinates, to conduct their investigations from an adversarial stance. As one staffer put it early in the investigation, "if you seem willing to talk on an issue, we lose interest. If you hold back, we'll push harder." This basic thrust remains true today.

A major milestone of the HSC investigation was the controversy over the right of Congress to declassify unilaterally materials furnished it. The investigation was stalled for over two weeks, until the DCI's letter of 30 September was accepted by Chairman Pike. Under the terms of the letter "... there will be no public disclosure of this classified material..." without a reasonable opportunity to consult on it. In the event of disagreement the question will be referred to the President, a step that has not proven necessary to date. The Agency's understanding of the agreement is that the Committee will submit materials for declassification, if it can be declassified, and that this extends to the drafts of the report treating the material in question. The Committee does not yet accept this assertion, but appears to be prepared to allow an Agency review of the drafts on an informal basis; the Agency has reviewed one paper to date, on the subject of proprietaries. The final details of this arrangement have not been worked out, and with the HSC engaged in writing its report, with a first printing scheduled 20 December, the time pressures for adequate technical review by the Agency may prove severe.

The Congressional members of the HSC seem quite deeply divided on the substantive issues which have arisen from their investigation. While none seems bent on abolition of the Agency, several quite clearly would like to have the Agency's covert action mandate removed entirely, or heavily circumscribed. The HSC hearings on Covert Action (9 December), Congressional Oversight (11 December) and the future of intelligence (12 December) should do much to clarify where the HSC stands on the basic issues it has raised since September.

II. Issues Raised by the House Select Committee

- A. Taken in its broadest terms, the HSC investigation has been focused on three issues, the costs, risks, and value received from the intelligence production process. HSC consideration of these issues, and the shortcomings they have perceived therein, have led them to their current central concern, which deals with governmental structure shaping the decision-making processes, which in turn directly influence the intelligence community.

1. Under costs the following more specific matters have been looked into:

- a. Agency fiscal management (the suspicion of profligacy remains);
- b. covert procurement and proprietaries (the costs imposed by perhaps unnecessary secrecy);
- c. accommodation procurement (why so many favors to foreigners?);
- d. local procurement by overseas stations (why so much liquor and so many "odd-ball" items?);
- e. costing methods (out of the [redacted] briefing came the feeling that by artificially low costing of [redacted] the true costs of covert action operations might be camouflaged.)

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2. Under risks the following more specific matters have been looked into:

- a. covert action (some of the HSC committee members appear to feel that CA might well be ruled out of the Agency's charter. Others believe that the covert actions operations they have looked at in some detail - the

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[redacted]
costly and more or less "forced upon" the Agency by a decision making process dominated by Dr. Kissinger. Even those who favor a continuation of covert action on a highly selective basis, appear to want to modify the decision-making process, to make it less easy to control by non-elected officials.);

- b. contacts with media (Pike says that such contacts may be of more risk to the Agency's credibility and the freedom of the press than they are worth. The problems of the Agency's dwindling access to overseas cover has been forcefully stated to Pike by the DCI, but he appears unconvinced.);
- c. detailees (in this case, the HSC's concern that the Agency's detailees were risks to the integrity of the organizations to which they were assigned has been mitigated by what they have learned and been told. Some lingering

negative feelings about the program appear to remain, particularly with regard to the Agency's having one of its officers as Recording Secretary of the 40 Committee. Other assignments to the White House and NSC have also been looked upon with a jaundiced eye.);

- d. contacts with local U.S. police forces (largely a concern about past activities - current suit against the Agency may bring these feelings into a more current focus.);
- e. CIA-IRS relationship (here there has been a suspicion of collusion, possibly evasion of tax payments, etc., which has been somewhat alleviated by material provided to the committee. An earlier concern about possible hidden profits from our proprietaries has also been alleviated.).

NOTE: The HSC's conception of "risks" is somewhat different from the view held by most Agency officers. While the Agency is largely concerned about security risks, the HSC is focused upon risks to national credibility and national institutions which may result from what they deem to be ill-conceived intelligence operations.

- 3. Under value received the following more specific matters have been looked into:
 - a. intelligence "failures" (by looking at isolated instances such as the Middle-East War of 1973 and the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the HSC has developed a basis for saying that our intelligence production apparatus is not what it should be);
 - b. failures in analysis (as the specific incidents mentioned above have been looked at closely, some members of the HSC have come to the overly-pat conclusion that our collection abroad is excellent, and that it is our analysis in Washington which is at fault.);
 - c. suppression of intelligence by policy levels (Testimony by Sam Adams, the Boyatt memorandum issue, and possible differences between Dr. Kissinger and James Schlesinger over Soviet adherence to SALT have led some members of the HSC to feel that policy makers ignore or, even worse, suppress intelligence or advice which does not "fit" with a pre-determined policy objective.).

B. The HSC's hopes to change the decision-making processes bearing upon the intelligence community appear as yet largely ill-defined. The following concepts have been mentioned and almost certainly will be the subject of discussion in wrap-up hearings before the committee to be held in December:

1. improved Congressional oversight (HSC members admit the laxity of past Congressional oversight, but probably no more than two or three members of the HSC would seek membership on any permanent oversight committee.);
2. limiting the powers of the executive (a fundamental and underlying motive of the HSC investigation, which has not yet, to our knowledge, been fleshed out in terms of concrete planning.);
3. strengthening the 40 Committee (HSC hearings on covert action have caused them to believe that the 40 Committee, if broadened in membership, and given a more central role in decisions affecting covert action, might lead to both fewer and better covert actions.);
4. strengthening the DCI vis a vis the intelligence community (the HSC impression that certain covert actions have been forced upon the Agency makes them hope that the DCI's ability to say "no" might be enhanced. 25X1A
5. limiting or refining CIA's charter, with particular regard to covert action and [redacted]

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[redacted] and other governmental organizations (Feeling on this issue is deeply divided within HSC membership. Some would clearly appear to want to limit the Agency to intelligence gathering only. Others are far more permissive in their attitudes. How this broad mix of attitudes will be sorted out (if at all) in terms of concrete proposals, remains to be seen.).

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House Select Committee on Intelligence

Otis G. Pike (D., N.Y.), Chairman

Robert N. Giaimo (D., Conn.)	Robert McClory (R., Ill.)
William Lehman (D., Fla.)	David C. Treen (R., La.)
James V. Stanton (D., Ohio)	Robert W. Kasten (R., Wis.)
Les Aspin (D., Wis.)	James P. Johnson (R., Colo.)
Ronald V. Dellums (D., Calif.)	
Morgan F. Murphy, (D., Ill.)	
Dale Milford (D., Texas)	
Philip H. Hayes (D., Ind.)	

SENIOR STAFF MEMBERS

A. Searle Field	-	Staff Director
John L. Boos	-	
Aaron B. Donner	-	Counsel

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House Calendar No. 132

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. RES. 591

[Report No. 94-351]

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 11, 1975

Mr. BOLLING, from the Committee on Rules; reported the following resolution;
which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

RESOLUTION

1 *Resolved*, That (a) there is hereby established in the
2 House of Representatives a Select Committee on Intelli-
3 gence to conduct an inquiry into the organization, operations,
4 and oversight of the intelligence community of the United
5 States Government.

6 (b) The select committee shall be composed of thirteen
7 Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed
8 by the Speaker. The Speaker shall designate one of the
9 members as chairman.

10 (c) For the purposes of this resolution the select com-
11 mittee is authorized to sit during sessions of the House and
12 during the present Congress whether or not the House has

13 recessed or adjourned. A majority of the members of the

3

1 (8) such other related matters as the select comi-
2 mittee shall deem necessary to carry out the purposes of
3 this resolution.

4 SEQ. 3. In carrying out the purposes of this resolution,
5 the select committee is authorized to inquire into the activities
6 of the following:

7 (1) the National Security Council;

8 (2) the United States Intelligence Board;

9 (3) the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
10 Board;

11 (4) the Central Intelligence Agency;

12 (5) the Defense Intelligence Agency;

13 (6) the intelligence components of the Departments
14 of the Army, Navy, and Air Force;

15 (7) the National Security Agency;

16 (8) the Intelligence and Research Bureau of the
17 Department of State;

18 (9) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

19 (10) the Department of the Treasury and the De-
20 partment of Justice;

21 (11) the Energy Research and Development Ad-
22 ministration; and

23 (12) any other instrumentalities of the United
24 States Government engaged in or otherwise responsible

1 select committee, of any information which would adversely
2 affect the intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence
3 Agency in foreign countries or the intelligence activities in
4 foreign countries of any other department or agency of the
5 Federal Government.

6 (b) No employee of the select committee or any person
7 engaged by contract or otherwise to perform services for the
8 select committee shall be given access to any classified infor-
9 mation by the select committee unless such employee or per-
10 son has received an appropriate security clearance as deter-
11 mined by the select committee. The type of security clear-
12 ance to be required in the case of any such employee or per-
13 son shall, within the determination of the select committee,
14 be commensurate with the sensitivity of the classified infor-
15 mation to which such employee or person will be given
16 access by the select committee.

17 (c) As a condition for employment as described in
18 section 5 of this resolution, each person shall agree not to
19 accept any honorarium, royalty, or other payment for a
20 speaking engagement, magazine article, book, or other en-
21 deavor connected with the investigation and study under-
22 taken by this committee.

23 SEC. 7. The expenses of the select committee under this
24 resolution shall not exceed \$750,000 of which amount not to
25 exceed \$100,000 shall be available for the procurement of

House Calendar No. 132

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. RES. 591

[Report No. 94-351]

RESOLUTION

Establishing a Select Committee on
Intelligence.

By Mr. BOLLING

JULY 11, 1975

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RULES FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE INTELLIGENCE

REVIEW STAFF

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1. The Rules of the House are the Rules of the committee except as otherwise provided herein.

RULE 2. MEETING PROCEDURES

2.1 For the purpose of carrying out any of its functions and duties the committee is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned, and to hold hearings. The committee will meet at such times as may be fixed by the Chairman or by the written request of a majority of the Members of the committee in accordance with House Rule XI, clause 2(c). Members of the committee shall be given reasonable notice which, except in extraordinary circumstances, shall be at least 24 hours in advance of any meeting.

2.2 No general proxies may be used for any purpose. A member may vote by special proxy, which must be in writing, shall assert that the Member is unable to be present at the meeting of the committee, shall designate the person who is to execute the proxy authorization, and shall be limited to a specific measure or matter and any amendments or motions pertaining thereto; except that a Member may authorize a general proxy only for motions to recess, adjourn or other procedural matters. Each proxy to be effective shall be signed by the Member assigning his vote and shall contain the date and time of day that the proxy is signed.

Proxies may not be counted for a quorum. All proxies must be

filed with the committee counsel and be available for inspection at any time.

2.3 No recommendation shall be reported or tabled by the committee unless a majority of the committee is actually present.

2.4 A rollcall of the Members may be had on the request of two Members.

2.5 A majority of the committee shall constitute a quorum for the purposes of taking final action on matters before the committee. However, a quorum for the purpose of taking testimony and receiving evidence by the committee shall consist of two Members, at least one of which shall be a member of the Minority Party unless the ranking minority Member consents otherwise.

2.6 At each hearing the Chairman shall announce prior to the opening statement of the witness the subject of the investigation and a copy of the committee rules shall be made available to each witness.

2.7 The time any one Member may address the committee on any matter under consideration by the committee shall not exceed five minutes, and then only when he has been recognized by the Chairman, except that this time limit may be exceeded by unanimous consent.

2.8 Each committee meeting for the transaction of business shall be open to the public except when the committee, in open session and with a quorum being present, determines by rollcall vote that all or part of the remainder of the meeting on that day shall be closed to the public. No person other than Members of the committee and such committee staff and such departmental representatives as may be authorized by the committee shall be

present at any business session which has been closed to the public:
Provided, however, that the committee may hold joint hearings of
meetings at the discretion of the Chairman in consultation with
the ranking Minority Member with committees having concurrent
jurisdiction over intelligence matters; *clearance*
and Provided, further *Staff?*
that the committee may by the same procedure vote to close one
subsequent meeting.

2.9 Each hearing conducted by the committee shall be open to the
public except when the committee, in open session with a quorum
being present, determines by rollcall vote that all or part of
the remainder of that hearing on that day shall be closed to the
public because disclosure of testimony, evidence or other matters
be considered would endanger the national security or would
violate any law or rule of the House of Representatives. No
person other than Members of the committee and committee staff and
such departmental representatives as may be authorized by the
committee shall be present at any hearing which has been closed to
the public: Provided, however, that the committee may by the same
procedure vote to close one subsequent day of hearing.

2.10 The committee shall make public announcement of the date,
place and subject matter of the committee hearing at least one
week before the commencement of the hearing. However, if the
Chairman of the committee determines that there is good cause to
begin the hearing sooner, he shall make the announcement at the
earliest possible date. Any announcement made under this para-
graph shall be promptly published in the Daily Digest.

RULE 3. SUBPOENAS

3.1 The committee may require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memorandums, papers, documents and other memoranda and materials as it deems necessary. Any such subpoena may be issued by the committee in the conduct of an investigation or activity or a series of investigations or activities, only when authorized by a majority of the Members of the committee, and authorized subpoenas shall be signed by the Chairman of the committee or by any Member designated by the Chairman. Each subpoena shall contain a copy of House Resolution 138, 94th Congress, 1st session. Compliance with any subpoena issued by the committee may be enforced only as authorized by the House.

RULE 4. PROCEDURES FOR TAKING TESTIMONY

4.1 When giving testimony, witnesses may be accompanied by their own counsel. There shall be no direct or cross examination by witness' counsel. The Chairman of the committee, or any Member of the committee or staff member designated by the Chairman may administer oaths to any witness.

4.2 Any prepared statement to be presented by a witness to the committee shall be submitted to the committee at least 72 hours in advance of presentation and shall be distributed to all Members of the committee at least 48 hours in advance of presentation.

If a prepared statement contains security information bearing a classification, it shall be submitted to the committee at least 72 hours in advance of presentation.

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committee rooms to all Members of the committee at least 48 hours in advance of presentation; however, no such statement shall be removed from the committee offices: Provided, however, that these requirements may be waived by the Chairman.

4.3 In the discretion of the committee, witnesses may submit brief and pertinent sworn statements for inclusion in the record. The committee is the sole judge of the pertinency of testimony and evidence adduced at its hearings.

4.4 If the committee determines that evidence or testimony at a hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any person, it shall:

- a. receive such evidence or testimony in executive session,
- b. afford such person an opportunity voluntarily to appear as a witness, and
- c. receive and dispose of requests from such person to subpoena additional witnesses

4.5 Except as provided in Rule 4.4 above, the Chairman shall receive and the committee shall dispose of requests to subpoena additional witnesses.

4.6 The minority party Members of the committee shall be entitled, upon timely request to the Chairman of a majority of them, to call witnesses selected by the minority to testify with respect to the matter in question. *two investigations*

4.7 When a witness is before the committee, Members of the committee may put questions to the witness only when they have been recognized by the Chairman for that purpose

4.8 Members of the committee who so desire shall have not to exceed five minutes to interrogate each witness until such time

as each Member has had an opportunity to interrogate such witness; thereafter, additional time for questioning witnesses by Members is discretionary with the Chairman.

4.9 No sworn depositions will be taken unless authorized by the Chairman, who shall inform the ranking Minority Member, or by vote of the committee.

RULE 5. COMMITTEE RECORDS

ultimate disposition?

5.1 The result of each rollcall in any meeting of the committee shall be made available by the committee for public inspection in the offices of the committee pursuant to such procedures as the Chairman may establish. Information so available for public inspection shall include a description of the amendment, motion, order, or other proposition and the name of each Member voting for and each Member voting against such amendment, motion, order, or proposition, and whether by proxy or in person, and the names of those Members present but not voting: Provided, however, that the Chairman, in consultation with the Ranking Minority Member shall take appropriate measures to delete classified or sensitive material.

5.2 The attendance records of Members at committee meetings shall be available for public inspection in the offices of the committee pursuant to such procedures as the Chairman may establish.

RULE 6. STAFF

6.1 The appointment of all staff members and consultants shall be made by the Chairman and the Staff Director in consultation with

the Ranking Minority Member. Staff members shall be under the direct supervision and control of the Chairman and Staff Director in consultation with the ranking Minority Member, and shall be responsive to all Members of the committee.

6.2 The staff of the committee shall not discuss either the substance or procedure of the work of the committee with anyone other than a Member of the committee or committee personnel.

6.3 As a condition of employment each staff member shall affirm that he fully understands the rules and regulations of the committee and agrees to abide by them.

6.4 The Chairman shall have the authority to utilize the services, information, facilities and personnel of the departments and establishments of the governments, and to procure the temporary and intermittent services of experts or consultants or organizations thereof to make studies or assist or advise the committee with respect to any matter under investigation.

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RULE 7. PROTECTION OF PAPERS AND DOCUMENTS

7.1 All material and testimony received or obtained pursuant to House Resolution 138, 94th Congress, shall be deemed to have been received by the committee in executive session and shall be given appropriate safekeeping.

7.2 The Chairman in consultation with the ranking Minority Member of the committee shall, with the approval of the committee, establish such procedures as in his judgement may be necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of all material and testimony received or obtained pursuant to House Resolution 138,

this information by any member of the committee.
procedures as may be established by the committee.

7.3 Until such time as the committee has submitted its final report to the House, classified or other sensitive information in the committee records and files shall not be made available or disclosed to other than the committee membership and the committee staff, except as may be otherwise determined by the committee.

RULE 8 . COMMITTEE REPORT

8.1 If, at any time of approval of any report by the committee, any Member of the committee gives notice of intention to file supplemental, minority, or additional views, that Member shall be entitled to not less than five calendar days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays) in which to file such views, in writing and signed by that Member, with the Staff Director of the committee. All such views so filed by one or more Members of the committee shall be included within, and shall be a part of, the report filed by the committee with respect to that matter.

RULE 9. RULE CHANGES

9.1 These rules may be amended or replaced by the committee, provided that a notice in writing of the proposed change has been given to each Member at least 48 hours prior to the meeting at which action thereon is to be taken.

~~DRAFT~~

SECURITY REGULATIONS

1) The Chairman, the ranking minority Member and the staff director shall at all times have access to and be responsible for all papers and things received from any source by subpoena or otherwise. Other Members of the committee shall have access in accordance with the procedures hereafter set forth.

2) The security officer will maintain all classified and sensitive information in secure safes in the committee spaces and will maintain current records of the receipt, internal handling and disposition of such classified information.

3) The Chairman shall designate information as 'sensitive' in consultation with the ranking minority Member and the staff director.

Only Members of the committee and properly cleared committee staff may have access to material and testimony received or obtained pursuant to House Resolution 138, 94th Congress.

5) All committee staff members with a need to handle classified information will have appropriate security clearances.

6) Material and testimony received or obtained pursuant to House Resolution 138, 94th Congress may be examined only in the committee rooms and the committee hearing room.

7) Members of the committee desiring access to classified information will be required to identify the information they desire and sign the Information Sheet.

8) Material and testimony received or obtained pursuant to House Resolution 138, 94th Congress will be read by the committee Members in a reading room designated for the purpose.

9) The security officer

-2-

material and the time of arrival and departure of all Members having access to classified information.

10) A staff representative will ensure that the classified documents used by the Member are returned to the proper custodian or to original safekeeping as appropriate.

11) No notes, reproductions or recordings may be made of any portion of such classified information for use outside committee spaces.

12) The contents of such classified or sensitive information or any working papers or memoranda of the committee or any material and testimony received or obtained pursuant to House Resolution 138, 94th Congress will not be divulged to any unauthorized person in any way, form, shape or manner.

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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September 3, 1975

The Honorable Otis G. Pike, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515



Dear Chairman Pike:

On July 25th I left with you a packet of materials concerning approaches that might be appropriate in handling the variety of demands your Committee will be making upon the Agency in the months to come. Since then we have had discussions regarding security and other aspects of your Committee's investigation. In addition, the Committee's Staff Director and Counsel have held a series of discussions with our Special Counsel and members of my staff. With this then as background, let me suggest certain approaches that I believe will insure our ability to respond promptly and fully to the needs of the Committee.

I. Documents:

Upon receipt of a written request from the Chairman, Staff Director or Committee Counsel for documents dealing with a particular area of inquiry, the Agency will promptly respond with an answer, a partial response or at least a statement as to when the materials will be available. To insure that there are no misunderstandings as to the materials requested, it maybe helpful for your staff to initially discuss the scope of a proposed request with our staff before it is reduced to writing. In addition, I have encouraged our staff to contact your staff members and discuss the precise nature of any request not clear on its face. Further, our staff has been instructed to make materials available as soon as they are ready and not to hold up a response until all of the materials requested have been compiled. When documents are withheld because clearance is being sought from another Agency, your Committee will be notified.

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To assist us in servicing your requests we have also asked that the various requests for documents be coordinated in order that we might be advised as to the House Select Committee's priorities among the various demands. We have set up a reading room at the Agency where documents will be made available for examination.

With respect to the documents to be made available to the Committee, there are certain sensitive materials that must be protected not only from exposure but even the risk of exposure. Included in this sensitive category are:

- identities of agents and sources;
- identities of persons involved in Agency operations who would be subject to personal, physical danger, to extreme harassment or to economic or other reprisals if their names were to be publicly identified;
- material provided confidentially by cooperating foreign intelligence services;
- details that would reveal the nature of sensitive intelligence methods and techniques of collection, by technical and human means;
- identities of cooperating Americans and American organizations and contacts to whom we have a confidential relationship.

In making such deletions, our staff has been instructed to describe the deletion, e.g., as a CIA officer or a source, in order to place the material in context. Where your staff believes that a particular name or detail is critical to their inquiry, this then should be brought to the attention of our staff and the matter can be negotiated. I believe this procedure is consistent with your statement to me that the Committee is not interested in our sources and methods, or in the names of agents as such.

Finally, some proposed testimony and requests for documents may enter the area of the executive decision-making process in which the need to protect the confidentiality of advice or recommendations to policy-making bodies has long been recognized. This would apply, for example, to Presidential or 40 Committee deliberations relating to approval of CIA actions. Where such a circumstance exists, the Committee will be advised.

We will want to work together, too, to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, could impair the legitimate rights of privacy of individuals. I am sure we can deal with these matters so as to protect this essential privacy while satisfying the Select Committee's need for a full understanding of intelligence activities.

II. Witnesses:

You doubtless will want to interview present and former CIA employees. It is our understanding that prospective witnesses will be advised of the scope of the inquiry and may be accompanied by counsel, as provided by the Committee rules. Current employees will, of course, be made available to the Select Committee for staff interviews and for testimony. This on rare occasions may require special arrangements, including testimony under alias, to protect the identity of employees whose safety or future utility might be jeopardized by exposure. With respect to the interview of Agency employees who are currently on detail to other agencies in the government and whose testimony relates to CIA matters, we will arrange with the host agency to make the employee available upon request of the Committee. Where the employee is sought to testify with respect to matters concerning his detail or matters relating to the host agency, we will bring your request to the attention of the host agency. Thus, if your staff will advise us of whom they wish to interview, we will make the appropriate arrangements with our employees. While I have no authority to direct the cooperation of ex-employees, I will be happy to assist you in any way I can. In a very few cases, their identities also will have to be protected.

As you know, each employee had to sign a secrecy agreement upon entering on duty. This requires that he keep forever secret all classified information gained during his employment, unless he obtains prior authorization to disclose it from the DCI. These secrecy agreements signed by our employees and ex-employees need not impair the necessary work of your Committee. In view of the security protection contemplated by your Committee, I have determined that disclosure of otherwise protected information to the Select Committee or its designated staff members will, in most instances, constitute an authorized provision of information within the meaning of the secrecy agreements. The attached Employee Bulletin may be used to indicate authorization for

any Agency employee to furnish information to the Select Committee or to appropriate staff members on matters which otherwise would be covered by their secrecy agreement. Where, however, the answer to the particular question covers the highly sensitive matters mentioned above, the employee or former employee is obligated to consult with the Agency before responding. In this regard, the Agency would appreciate being notified before the Committee contacts each Agency employee or ex-employee who is to be interviewed or called to testify. I attached a separate letter addressed to CIA ex-employees which should be shown to them for the same purpose.


25X1A Since so many of our activities involve sensitive areas, I propose an approach which should aid the Committee in expediting its investigation. If the Committee will notify Special Counsel to the Director, of the areas of its inquiry at the outset, we would be in a position to highlight particularly sensitive issues and work out methods to insure that your Committee obtains what it needs without unnecessary risk to the sensitive matters. We will then be in a position to bring to the Committee's attention whether any particularly sensitive issues may be involved. Such an approach will insure you get the information you need to perform your task and at the same time safeguard sensitive intelligence sources and methods which I am obligated by law to protect.

In conclusion, we ask that your Committee make an early determination as to the ultimate disposition of its records upon completion of its tasks. I am sure you will join me in recognizing that permanent, safe storage and security safeguards will be necessary to protect the sensitivity of the Committee's records. To this end you may wish to discuss permanent disposition with the Archivist of the United States. This matter of ultimate disposition of the records of your Committee continues to concern the Intelligence Community. I hope that this important matter can be disposed of promptly.

It is in our mutual interests to ensure that your review proceeds as smoothly and as expeditiously as possible. Toward that end, I have instructed all CIA

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personnel to respond in a spirit of cooperation. A
copy of that instruction is attached. And, I am prepared
to consult with the Committee at any time to determine
appropriate courses of action.

Sincerely,



W. E. Colby
Director.

Attachments:
As Stated

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1
E

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

REVIEW STAFF

75-3102

30 September 1975

The Honorable Otis G. Pike, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

With the approval of the President, I am forwarding herewith the classified material, additional to the unclassified material forwarded with my letter of 29 September 1975, which is responsive to your subpoena of September 12, 1975. This is forwarded on loan with the understanding that there will be no public disclosure of this classified material (nor of testimony, depositions or interviews concerning it) without a reasonable opportunity for us to consult with respect to it. In the event of disagreement, the matter will be referred to the President. If the President then certifies in writing that the disclosure of the material would be detrimental to the national security of the United States, the matter will not be disclosed by the Committee, except that the Committee would reserve its right to submit the matter to judicial determination.

In some 12 instances in the enclosed classified material, excisions have been made of particularly sensitive matters. In 10 of these instances, they would pinpoint the identity of individuals who would be subject to exposure. In two cases, this would violate an understanding with a foreign government that its cooperation will not be disclosed. In each such case, Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to discuss with you, and the Committee if necessary, the specific basis for this exclusion due to the exceptionally high risk involved, and I am sure that we can come to a mutual understanding with respect to its continued secrecy or a form in which its substance could be made available to the Committee and still give it the high degree of protection it deserves. In case of disagreement, the



- 2 -

matter will be submitted to the President under the procedure outlined above, and the Committee would of course reserve its right to undertake judicial action.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

Enclosures

WEC:blp (30 Sep 75)

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
Original - Addressee via hand of

25X1A

- 1 - DCI
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - SC/DCI
- 1 - Review Staff
- 1 - ER
- 1 - OLC
- 1 - OGC
- 1 - IG
- 1 - DDI
- 1 - DDO
- 1 - DDS&T
- 1 - DDA
- 1 - D/DCI/IC
- 1 - D/DCI/NIO
- 1 - Assistant to the Director

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Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100120001-5



14 October 1975

The Honorable Otis G. Pike, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515


Dear Chairman Pike:


I have instructed our staff to once again schedule interviews of CIA witnesses for your Committee. The witnesses will be prepared to discuss classified material in informal interviews or depositions conducted by House Select Committee staff in the same fashion as is outlined in my September 30, 1975 letter to you, i.e.,:

"...there will be no public disclosure of this classified material (nor of testimony, depositions or interviews concerning it) without a reasonable opportunity for us to consult with respect to it. In the event of disagreement, the matter will be referred to the President. If the President then certifies in writing that the disclosure of the material would be detrimental to the national security of the United States, the matter will not be disclosed by the Committee, except that the Committee would reserve its right to submit the matter to judicial determination."

I understand that this is agreeable to you.

Sincerely,


W. E. Colby
Director



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EMPLOYEE BULLETIN

House Select Committee on Intelligence

House Resolution 591 established a House Select Committee to review U.S. intelligence activities. The Resolution calls for a comprehensive review of the organization, operations, and oversight of the U.S. intelligence community.

It is in the interests of all of us to see that the Select Committee gains a full understanding of our activities and the importance of their contribution to the country as expeditiously as possible. I have every confidence that the inquiry will produce new understanding of and improvements in the American intelligence system.

It is with this conviction that I have pledged my personal cooperation, and that of the CIA. I have advised Chairman Pike and Vice-Chairman McClory that employees of the CIA will be available to the Select Committee for interviews and for testimony. Most of these interviews and testimony will be designed merely to obtain factual or background information. The Committee may also delve into activities it feels are not clearly spelled out in our charter. Employees called for interview or testimony who feel concern about their personal responsibility should not hesitate to consult with our General Counsel. They furthermore may be assured that the Agency will give every proper assistance to employees in placing in context the responsibilities and authority that were laid upon them with respect to any areas under inquiry.

We are working out procedures with the Committee Staff to facilitate their work. Attached to this bulletin is a letter which I have sent to Chairman Pike. To facilitate the necessary work of the Committee and in recognition of the security protection contemplated by the Committee, I have determined that disclosure of otherwise protected information to the Select Committee or its designated Staff members will constitute authorized provision of information within the meaning of the Secrecy Agreements signed by each CIA employee, subject to the

special procedures and limitations set forth in the letter regarding particularly sensitive matters. Of course, employees must bear in mind that this limited release allowing them to disclose classified information to the Committee does not constitute a general release. It is one limited to the Committee only.

The cooperative spirit of our relationship with the Committee and its Staff must at the same time take into account the rights of Agency employees. The Committee Staff has agreed to advise employees of their Constitutional rights at the beginning of any interview or other appearance.

When a current Agency employee is selected to be interviewed, the Staff Director or Chief Counsel will normally notify the Review Staff (351-4086) who will then contact the employee through the appropriate Directorate. This procedure is intended to allow time for the employee to gain general legal advice if he or she wants it, on which he may consult our General Counsel, and to obtain security guidance from an appropriate senior officer.

As in the case of the Senate Select Committee, my own belief is that after a careful review of all U.S. intelligence activities, the House Committee will address needed legislative changes and will reaffirm its confidence in the importance and contribution of U. S. intelligence.


W. E. Colby
Director

Attachment: a/s

DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES

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H

Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100120001-5

To Former Employees of The Central Intelligence Agency:

House Resolution 591 established a Select Committee of the House of Representatives to review U. S. intelligence activities. It is in the interest of the nation to see that the Select Committee receives the information it needs to fully understand our activities and the importance of our contributions to the country.

Since you have been contacted by a member of the Select Committee's staff for interview you may have questions of your own regarding the implications of the secrecy agreement you signed for the testimony sought from you. As you will recall, the agreement you signed as a condition of employment requires that you keep forever secret all classified information gained by you during the course of your employment. Further, the agreement requires that you may not disclose classified information, either orally or by publication, without prior authorization from the Director of Central Intelligence even after employment with the CIA has been terminated.


In recognition of the security protection undertaken by the Select Committee, I have determined that the disclosure of otherwise protected information to the Select Committee or its designated staff members will-- with the exception of a few, specially sensitive matters-- in most instances constitute a fully authorized provision of information within the meaning of the secrecy agreement. Of course, employees must bear in mind that this limited release allowing them to disclose classified information to the Committee does not constitute a general release. It is one limited to the Committee only.

The category of especially sensitive matters includes the following:

1. Identities of agents and sources;
2. Names of persons involved in Agency operations who would be subject to personal, physical danger, to harassment or to economic or other reprisals if publicly identified;

3. Material provided confidentially by cooperating foreign services;
4. Details that would reveal the nature of sensitive intelligence methods and techniques of collection, by technical and human means; or
5. Identities of cooperating American organizations and contacts to whom we have pledged confidentiality.

If the proposed answers to any of the questions put to you involve especially sensitive matters, you should advise the interviewer that you have a problem and wish to obtain advice from the Agency. Contact the CIA Review Staff (351-4086) for this purpose.



W. E. Colby
Director

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Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100120001-5

Since the beginning of the HSC investigation, the Agency has received approximately 195 separate written requests for information. Many of these requests contained several specific items to be fulfilled. As of 5 December, approximately 185 of these requests had been answered. All will be responded to by the end of December. Tens of thousands of man hours have gone into preparing and transmitting these responses to the HSC.

The letters which follow have been chosen to demonstrate how the HSC requests have gradually changed from the very broad and ill-formed submissions of July, to the more specific requests of October and November. In some cases, a Review Staff comment at the end of a letter indicates how it was responded to.

STANTON, OHIO
DALLAS, CALIF.
MURPHY, ILL.
SPIN, WIS.
MILFORD, TEX.
H. HAYES, IND.
LEHMAN, FLA.

DAVID C. TREEN, LA.
JAMES P. JOHNSON, COLO.
ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., WIS.

TELEPHONE: (202) 225-9731

Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100120001-5

U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

July 30, 1975

*James Phillips
reply to letter*

25X1A

[Redacted]

Liaison Officer
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

75-2072

[Redacted]

25X1A

This is the letter you requested expressing in writing our requests for information concerning budgetary and financial matters of the Agency. To as great an extent as possible, we would appreciate receiving answers in written form. Some of the requested material may not presently exist in written form, and may take several staff days to compile. Could you please provide us with information as it becomes available, rather than waiting until all of this information can be compiled before making any of it available to us? I am assuming that appropriate security arrangements have been made for us to have access to this material and maintain custody of it.

Specifically, among the information we would like made available is:

1. Agency regulations. All current written Agency regulations, guidelines, and operating procedures, and all such which have been in effect at any time since January 1, 1960. *directives from director* *Sent 30 July 88*

2. Proprietaries. A list of all "proprietaries," that is organizations or firms operated by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency since the establishment of the Agency. We would hope this list would include the current net worth of each proprietary, the highest net worth each proprietary has had at any time in its existence, its address, its officers and directors, and a brief summary of the proprietary's activities on behalf of the Agency and otherwise.

3. Managed funds. A list of all accounts, funds, trusts, or other investments managed by the Agency or its employees on behalf of the Agency or its employees or its proprietaries. This would include credit union funds, the VIP program, escrow accounts, invested funds of proprietaries, any funds invested by or on behalf of any groups of employees, CIARD funds, and


any other funds at the disposal of the Agency invested or held other than in cash or government securities at any time since 1960.

4. Financial guidelines and financial guidance sheets. This would include any regulations, directives, guidelines or procedural outlines or memoranda governing the handling of financial transactions within or without the Agency, regardless of what name the Agency may use for such documents. This would include guidelines for handling budget matters, expenditures, fund transfers, disbursements of any kind, income of any kind, and for authorizing any financial transactions of any kind.


5. The Contingency Reserve Fund or Director's Contingency Fund. (All contingency funds or reserve funds.) We would like financial reports for the operation of the(se) fund(s) since calendar year 1960. This would include fund balances at all times, transfers in and out of the fund(s), and a brief explanation for every transfer in excess of \$10,000. We would also like to know the source of funds transferred in, and the recipient of funds transferred out in excess of \$10,000. Please also include all requests for appropriations for the(se) fund(s), whether such requests were granted or denied, whether such requests were actually for the(se) funds or for other accounts, whether such requests were masked or labeled as such.

These questions may not be well formed. They may not be clear. They may ask for information which does not exist. They may ask for information which, to compile, would require months of staff effort. To the extent that we can clarify or modify these requests to facilitate your response, please don't hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,



Edward Roeder



Emily Sheketoff
For the Committee

REVIEW STAFF COMMENT: These broad requests were all negotiated into more specific form. Proprietary companies were described but not named.

BERT N. GIAMMO, CONN.
JES V. STANTON, OHIO
RALD V. DELLUMS, CALIF.
SAN F. MURPHY, ILL.
SPIN, WIS.
MILFORD, TEX.
H. HAYES, IND.
M. LEHMAN, FLA.

ROBERT MCCLORY, ILL.
DAVID C. TREEN, LA.
JAMES P. JOHNSON, COLO.
ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., WIS.

TELEPHONE: (202) 225-9731

Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP89B0052R000100120001-5

U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

July 31, 1975

1, 5 + 7 sub
DPA 2, 3, 4, 5 + 7 sub

RS-2309

25X1A

[Redacted]
Liaison Officer
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

[Redacted] 25X1A

This is another request for information, expressed in writing as per your preference and to facilitate keeping track of these requests for our Committee and your review staff. In general, unless otherwise expressed, we would like to receive responses to these queries in written form, whether we are requesting written documents that already exist or information that has to be compiled. Today, let us specifically request the following:

1. Supplementary budgets. We would like all budget estimates and spending reports for funds the agency has received which are not contained and reported in the budget estimates provided to us yesterday. This should include but not be limited to budgets for joint projects administered by CIA but funded by other agencies or jointly by CIA and other agencies. It should also include any funds transferred to CIA or to CIA's control from proprietaries, or other branches of the federal government. In other words, we are trying to get a handle on what it costs to run CIA and CIA programs; we can't get that from the budget estimates provided to us.

2. The mission statements for each office, officer and office staff listed on the agency's overall organization chart. Obviously there are many different organization charts. We want to get down to the level of offices within the Directorates (I believe you said there are between 40 and 50), and we want to include other staffs and functions. We don't want to get down to the level of individual stations throughout the world.

3. Names of present and former officials. We would like a list of the names of officials who have had a grade of GS-15 or the equivalent or higher at every point over the last 15 years, and their titles and mission statements at every point during those 15 years.

4. A list of all internal audits performed by the agency

Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100120001-5

July 31, 1975

Page 2

over the past 15 years, and, to the extent that titles of those audits are not self-explanatory, a brief explanation of what was audited.

5. A list of all financial reports prepared by the agency. What we're interested in here is knowing what kinds of reports you have rather than what the specific reports were. For example, you have audits. You must have a variety of financial reports showing expenditures, and/or comparing expenditures with various schedules for spending, meeting objectives, and complying with various other agency programs and plans.


6. The budget for the intelligence community. This would include all intelligence community functions of the DCI, and the intelligence community staff. It would hopefully include such items as USIB, but would not include, for example, the Defense Department Intelligence budget. *mis addressed*

7. A floor plan of the agency. Nothing spooky, we just want to learn our way around so that we can find those restrooms and snack bars that we're now entitled to go to unescorted. *done*

We would also like to arrange over the weekend if possible to meet again with the Deputy Director for Administration and/or his assistant, and to meet with the Deputy for the Intelligence Community. Both of these discussions would be aimed primarily at understanding the budget and expenditures of the agency. If at all possible, we would very much like to meet again with Mr. Iams, Comptroller. As you recall, our earlier briefing with him occurred prior to our being cleared for compartmented information. If possible, we would very much appreciate having a copy of the budget submissions to Congress with us so that we can go over them with these various officials. Since it is a hassle for us to bring our copy out to the agency, could you make another one available for use during these discussions? *mis addressed*

Thanks again for your cooperation. And again, please don't hesitate to contact us if we can modify these requests to make compliance with them easier.

Sincerely,



Edward Roeder
for the Committee

OWIS G. PIKE, N. Y., CHAIRMAN

STANTON, OHIO
J. DELLUMS, CALIF.
F. MURPHY, ILL.
IN, WIS.
FORD, TEX.
HAYES, IND.
LEHMAN, FLA.

ROBERT MCCORMY, ILL.
DAVID C. TRENKLE, CALIF.
JAMES P. JOHNSON, CALIF.
ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., WIS.

A. STANLEY WELD, STAFF DIRECTOR
BARON R. DOWNEY, COUNSEL

Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100120001-5

Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

1 August 75

25X1A

75-2209

75-2209

Assistant to the Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear [redacted]

This letter is intended to incorporate written verification and clarification of requests discussed with you today by Emily Sheketoff, myself, or various officials of CIA who have forwarded requests on our behalf. We would appreciate your arranging for us to obtain custody of the following:

1. The Office of Finance Handbook.

25X1A

(Note: this is already received.)

A typical Audit Report prepared by the audit staff, and involving a Covert Action program approved by the 40 Committee, preferably for a fairly expensive program. (What we want here is a chance to review the style of audit reports, and to sample the ways the Audit Staff reports as many different kinds of findings as possible.)

25X1A

2. The [redacted] consultant's report on CIA auditing procedures.

5. Letters of Instruction (LOI's). We would like to receive the LOI's sent out by all CIA officials over the past two years, down to and including those sent by Office, Staff, and Division directors or operating heads.

6. Budgets and financial reports for "joint programs," and the resource packages and FAN's for them.

7. A list, to whatever extent it can be developed on short notice, of programs effectively (if not officially) run or directed by CIA, but not necessarily under CIA's financial control. These, I believe, are not considered "joint programs." An example of what I have in mind would be the PHOENIX program which, I understand, used Army and ARVN employees as well as CIA personnel but which did not involve any Economy Act transfers of funds to or from CIA. [redacted] at here is the extent to which resources come under the control of CIA

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1 August 75
page two

without CIA transferring funds out to pay for the resources, and without any official transfer of funds into CIA to account for the cost of those resources.

I understand that interviews have been arranged for 10:00 Saturday morning with Mr. Warner, and for 11:00 that morning with Mr. Iams. Also, we are told that arrangements have been made for us to meet with Mr. [] on Sunday morning at 9:00.


25X1A

Thank you so much for your help in framing our requests, and for handling them on such short notice. We particularly appreciate the work your staff did in arranging these interviews over the weekend.

Sometime soon, but possibly not until after our Wednesday meetings, we should get together to review the status of all requests for materials, eliminate duplications, and pinpoint and clarify requests remaining out. O.K.?

Again, thanks.

Sincerely,


Edward Roeder
for the Committee

W. STANTON, OHIO
V. DELUMIS, CALIF.
A. MURPHY, ILL.
ASHIN, WIS.
E. MILFORD, TEX.
LIP H. HAYES, IND.
JAM LEHMAN, FLA.

DAVID C. TREEN, LA
JAMES F. JOHNSON,
ROBERT W. KASTEN, WIS.

Select Committee on Intelligence
Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100120001-5
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

August 15, 1975

REVIEW STAFF

75-2457

25X1A

Assistant to the Director
Review Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

25X1A

I have received a report on the status of detailed personnel prepared by the CIA Office of Personnel dated 5 August 1975. In the following request, it is not necessary to include any of the information contained in that report. I would like the following information covering the period of 1 January 1972 through 5 August 1975:

1. A list of all CIA personnel detailed out to any Executive agency. The list should include the office or division of the CIA the detailee was employed by and his job title, where he was detailed to, his title at the detailed job, and the dates of the detail.

2. A list of all personnel detailed to the CIA. This list should include where the detailee was from, his job title at the job he held before being detailed to the CIA, what office or division he was or is working in at the CIA, the job title at the CIA, and the dates of detail to the CIA.

3. A list of all CIA personnel assigned out to any Executive agency. The list should include the office or division of the CIA the assignee was employed by and his job title, where he was assigned to, his title at the assigned job, and the dates of the assignment.

4. A list of all personnel assigned to the CIA. This list should include where the assignee was from, his title at the job held before being assigned to the CIA, what office or division he was or is working in at the CIA, the job title at the CIA, and the dates of assignment to the CIA.

AUG 16 12 03 PM '75

August 15, 1975

Page 2

Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100120001-5

officer

5. A list of the names of any official "contacts" at each Executive agency and a brief description of what that contact did for the agency.

Sincerely,

Emily Shekétoff

Emily Shekétoff
for the Committee

REVIEW STAFF COMMENT: The HSC was concerned that CIA, via its detailees, might be exerting undue influence over other governmental organizations. Their concern on this matter has been largely relieved by what they have learned.

OTIS G. PIKE, N. Y., CHAIRMAN

ROBERT N. GIAMMO, CONN.
JAMES V. STANTON, OHIO
RONALD V. DELUMS, CALIF.
MORGAN F. MURPHY, ILL.
JESSE ASPIN, WIS.
E. MILFORD, TEX.
JIP H. HAYES, IND.
LIAM LEHMAN, FLA.

ROBERT MCCLODY, ILL.
DAVID C. TREEN, LA.
ROBERT W. KASTEN, ILL.

ALBERT E. FELD, STAFF DIRECTOR
AARON B. DONNER, COUNSEL


TELEPHONE: (202) 225-9731

Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100120001-5

Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

August 29, 1975

25X1A



Assistant to the Director
Review Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

25X1A

In connection with our present review, it is requested that your Agency provide information and relevant documents concerning the following matters:

25X1A

-- A list showing date, cost, description of item donee, by name, title, and country, and the CIA official or level of authority who authorized gifts

25X1A

25X1A

-- A list of Congressmen, Senators and/or their staffs which have [redacted] since July 1, 1966. This list should show date, name of passenger, place of embarkation and debarkation of passenger and fare, if any paid.

25X1A

-- All information relating to agency installation visits in the Western Hemisphere, by Congressmen, Senators, and/or their staffs. The information should include date of arrival, name, reason for visit, date of departure from the installation, and mode of travel if known.

SEP 3 10 37 AM '75

25X1A

Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100120001-5

Page 2

August 29, 1975

--List of motion pictures and other audio visual material produced since July 1, 1966 by or on behalf of the agency, relating to agency activities or prominent personalities associated with the agency. The following are believed to exist (1) A film [redacted] and (2) a film entitled "Academy Anonymous." 25X1A


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-- All procurement records from the [redacted] for the period July 1, 1971 to the date the Station closed. Specifically these records should include contracts, requisitions, cables, telenotes, and other financial records relating or justifying procurements and the transfer authorization (T/A) of charges, and

-- Access to the records and files of the Covert Procurement Branch, Office of Logistics for Fiscal Years 1974 to date. Sepcific documents will be requested at a later date.

Please provide in writing your best estimate of the date this information can be provided or access can be gained.

Sincerely,



A. Searle Field
Staff Director

REVIEW STAFF COMMENT: Gifts to foreigners have excited HSC interest for some time. They have also focussed on accommodation procurements made for foreign leaders.

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Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100120001-5
Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

REVIEW STAFF

75-2872

September 9, 1975

25X1A

Review Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.


25X1A

Per our telephone conversation yesterday, I am requesting on behalf of the House Select Committee on Intelligence all CIA estimates, current intelligence reports and summaries, situation reports, and other pertinent documents which relate to the ability to predict the 1973 Mideast War, the 1974 overthrow of Makarios and Cyprus crisis, the 1974 coup in Portugal, the 1974 nuclear explosion by India, the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, the 1972 declarations of martial law in the Philippines and Korea, and the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Because the post-mortems performed by CIA Directorates of Intelligence and Operations which the Committee requested previously still have not been delivered, I hope you will understand why I must ask for a response to this request by Wednesday morning, September 10. As the Committee has scheduled hearings for Cyprus and the Middle East for this week, we need those documents by Wednesday morning; the others must be received by the Committee by the close of business, September 12.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,


Gregory G. Rushford
Investigator

REVIEW STAFF COMMENT: This request led the HSC into its study of so-called "intelligence failures."

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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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Select Committee on Intelligence

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U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

October 22, 1975

REVIEW STAFF

75-3304

25X1A

[redacted]
Assistant to the Director
Review Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Gregg:

25X1A

This letter will serve as a formal request for the following: A briefing of all Covert Action projects, with the exception of the [redacted] which have been conducted in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf since 1965 or which are presently being conducted in that area.

For example, please have ready for our staff on the day of the briefings a series of "key documents" which summarize the project from its inception, approval, implementation, and conclusion stages. This letter shall serve as a formal request for those and all other documents relating to these projects. In addition, please have ready for our access all project files which we will review at your offices and selectively choose those which are germane and which we may request delivery to our offices pending your review and sanitization.

Sincerely,

A. Searle Field

A. Searle Field
Staff Director

OCT 22 7 12 PM '75

ASF/FKK/mas

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
U.S. House of Representatives

Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100120001-5

November 13, 1975

25X1A

[Redacted]

Assistant to the Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

25X1A

[Redacted]

REVIEW STAFF

75-3460

This is to confirm my understanding reached yesterday with Ed Proctor and Paul Walsh on documents the CIA will make available to the Committee pursuant to our request of November 4:

(1) Memoranda concerning Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements between the CIA and the National Security Council, including the Verification Panel and the SALT Working Group. These memoranda include documents exchanged by all CIA officials who communicated with the NSC on SALT compliance matters on a "day to day" basis.

(2) Memos of Conversations between CIA officials and officials of the National Security Council, including Dr. Kissinger, which relate to Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements.

(3) Memoranda and briefings prepared for the DCI in relation to any National Security Council meetings on Soviet SALT compliance, and any Congressional testimony which has been given.

(4) Internal CIA studies, informal or formal, which were not disseminated to other agencies, including any compliance estimates prepared at the direction of a National Intelligence Officer, or by a National Intelligence Officer which relate to Soviet SALT compliance.

(5) Any other documents which relate to direction and guidance from the National Security Council on Soviet SALT compliance, including the arbitration by the NSC or its subgroups relating to differences in Soviet compliance issues between the CIA and other agencies such as the DIA or ACDA.


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(6) After the above documents have been searched, a search will be made of finished CIA publications such as the National Intelligence Bulletin which relate to SALT compliance

I further understand that a list of all CIA personnel involved in SALT monitoring is being prepared for Committee use in requesting interviews, which we will channel through your office as is our usual practice. Unless the interview is formal, involving sworn testimony, I would not expect that a CIA monitor be present.

As I also explained to Mr. Proctor yesterday, the Committee requests documents relating to the CIA's estimates of the Soviet Backfire weapons system, including any revisions which have been made since 1969 of that system's definition as strategic or tactical, its deployment, its characteristics, and its projected capabilities. We are particularly interested in memoranda between CIA officials and other agencies, such as the National Security Council and the Defense Intelligence Agency, which relate to differing estimates of the Backfire's mission and capabilities.

I do appreciate your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,



Gregory G. Rushford
For the Committee

REVIEW STAFF COMMENT: A request in response to which hundreds of documents were made available.

OTIS G. PIKE, M. Y., CHAIRMAN

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Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

REVIEW STAFF

75-3514

November 21, 1985

25X1A

Review Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Gregg:

Attached for your review is our 41 page (secret) draft report on the role of proprietaries in the CIA.

It is our intention to release an unclassified version of this report as part of our overall report on the intelligence community in the near future.

Therefore, we would appreciate your review, comments, and declassification of the report by December 7, 1975.

Mr. Mattox will be available to discuss both during and after your review, any alternative language that you may wish to suggest in those portions of the report you still consider too sensitive to declassify.

Sincerely,



A. Searle Field
Staff Director

REVIEW STAFF COMMENT: This was the first segment of the HSC's final report to which the Agency was given access. A negotiated text was achieved without too much difficulty.

Nov 21 12 44 PM '75